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COMMENTS
SENTENCING "CYBERSEX OFFENDERS":
INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS REQUIRE
INDIVIDUALIZED CONDITIONS WHEN COURTS
RESTRICT THEIR COMPUTER USE AND INTERNET
ACCESS
Emily Brant+
How to balance the government's obligation to protect the public with an
individual's right to act freely has long been an issue in the legal world. 1
Recently, the issue has focused on how courts can appropriately balance a
convicted "cybersex offender['s]",2 need for computer and Internet access with
the government's duties to protect society, deter further offending, and
promote rehabilitation. 3 Computers and the Internet-amenities in only
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1. Ed Johnson, Law Takes Aim at Sex Offenders' Computers: Internet Limits Raise
Questions, ASBURY PARK PRESS (N.J.), June 29, 2008, at Al; see also, e.g., Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (noting that the test for reasonableness "under the Fourth Amendment
requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interest at stake" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985))).
2. See Art Bowker & Michael Gray, An Introduction to the Supervision of the Cybersex
Offender, 68 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (Dec. 2004) (coining the term "cybersex offender").
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (describing factors for sentencing); Doug Hyne,
Examining the Legal Challenges to the Restriction of Computer Access as a Term of Probation or
Supervised Release, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 215, 215-17 (2002)
(discussing the balancing of the need to restrict access to computer and Internet use with
consideration of an individual's "First Amendment right to free speech and freedom of
association"). Sex offenders, as referenced throughout this Comment, refer to
those who have been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of
insanity for the commission of a sex offense and are required to register under Megan's
Law; those who are serving a special sentence of community or parole supervision due
to the commission of a sex offense; and those who have been convicted of promoting or
providing obscene material to persons under the age of eighteen.
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM. STATEMENT ON S. BILL No. 1979 (IR), L. 2007, C. 219 (2007), as
reprinted in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.6, at 14 (West Supp. 2008). Megan's Law, passed by the
United States Congress in 1996, has required every state to establish a registration system for
certain offenders, as well as a notification system to distribute the offender's information to the
public. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
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affluent homes two decades ago-have become commodities increasingly
accessible to many different groups of society.4 While this has granted many
Americans the ability to shop, communicate, and access an unlimited amount
of information with the mere click of a button, it has also led to the creation of
unprecedented and unparalleled problems.5
While the existence of sexual offenses is certainly not an exclusively modem
phenomena,6 computers with Internet access have become a frightful weapon
by creating a new avenue for sexual offenders to produce, exploit, and
disseminate illicit images, particularly those relating to child pornography.
7
The accessibility, affordability, and anonymity 8 presented by downloading
child pornography from the Internet has created a "nearly perfect medium for
offenders seeking children for sex." 9 Disguised in the "dark comers and back
alleys"' 0 of cyberspace, sex offenders can capitalize on the infinite number of
U.S.C. § 1407 1(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)) (requiring the release of certain information); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1407 1(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (directing the Attorney General to establish state
guidelines for registering offenders). For a comparative analysis of states' registration and
notification laws see Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community
Notification: Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 333, 334-
35 (1998).
4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2003, at 1, 4 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf (reporting
that in 2003, 70 million American households, or 62 percent, had one or more computers, up from
15 percent in 1989).
5. See Hyne, supra note 3, at 215-16 (noting that "computer crime has brought a dark side
to the otherwise beneficial 'information age' . . . [and that] [r]estricting an individual's ability to
use a computer has raised some thorny issues" (footnote omitted)).
6. See Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: The Appropriate Societal
Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 2-3 (2007) ("[W]hile
the existence of images of sexually exploited children is not new, today's images are accessible to
adults and children in a volume and severity never before seen.").
7. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 3 ("Cybersex offenders use computers to view,
store, produce, send, receive and/or distribute child and other forms of pornography; to
communicate, groom, and entice children and others for victimization; and to validate and
communicate with other sex offenders."). Federal law defines child pornography as any visual
depiction of a minor (under the age of eighteen) "engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8). "Sexually explicit conduct" includes "actual or simulated (A) sexual
intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or masochistic
abuse; or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2). While teenagers make up a majority of juvenile victims of sexual exploitation (59
percent), 28 percent are between the ages of six and eleven, and 13 percent are below the age of
six. Leary, supra note 6, at 7.
8. Andrew Bates & Caroline Metcalf, A Psychometric Comparison of Internet and Non-
Internet Sex Offenders from a Community Treatment Sample, 13 J. OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION 11,
12(2007).
9. MICHAEL MEDARIS & CATHY GIROUARD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROTECTING
CHILDREN IN CYBERSPACE: THE ICAC TASK FORCE PROGRAM 2 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/191213.pdf.
10. Id. at 1.
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unsupervised and curious children "with little fear of being readily discovered
* . . or identified."11 In addition, today's Internet has become the ideal
"marketplace for offenders seeking to acquire material for their child
pornography collections."' 12 Access to a computer and the Internet greatly
increases an offender's ability to produce, store, and transmit explicit images,
13
which are "used by child molesters to recruit, seduce, and control their
victims.
' 14
At the same time, however, the Internet has grown to play an integral role in
the lives of most Americans. According to a recent survey, 73 percent of
American adults use the Internet for a myriad of reasons, including
occupational and educational purposes, as well as various daily activities.
Because the Internet is such an indispensible tool and is enjoyed throughout
many sectors of society,' 6 it has been difficult for courts to decide whether to
restrict a sexual offender's access to computers, the Internet, or both, as a
condition of supervised release.17
Currently, there is a circuit split over the degree to which courts should
restrict a convicted sex offender's access to computers and the Internet.1 8 The
courts have struggled to find the appropriate balance between a sex offender's
right to access the Internet with the broader societal goals of protecting the
11. Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 3.
12. MEDARIS & GIROUARD, supra note 9, at 2.
13. Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 3.
14. MEDARIS & GIROUARD, supra note 9, at 2. While all cases are unique, strong anecdotal
evidence exists among those involved in prosecuting child pornography cases that there is a
strong correlation between those who collect child pornography and those convicted of child
molestation in seeking out potential victims. Id. By exposing children to pornographic images of
other victims with the intention of building a sense of comfort and by using pictures of the victim
to coerce them into keeping quiet, offenders are ultimately able to use these pornographic images
as a tool to exert power over their victims. Id.
15. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, LATEST TRENDS: INTERNET ACTIVITIES
(2008), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/trends/IntemetActivities_7.22.08.htm.
16. See generally id (displaying survey results depicting a wide variety of common Internet
activities). The Pew Internet & American Life Project also reported that 88 percent of local
government officials now use the Internet to communicate with their constituents' through e-mail
or conduct research to learn of their constituents' activities and opinions. ELENA LARSON & LEE
RAINIE, DIGITAL TOWN HALL: How LOCAL OFFICIALS USE THE INTERNET AND THE CIVIC
BENEFITS THEY CITE FROM DEALING WITH CONSTITUENTS ONLINE 2 (Oct. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.pewintemet.org/report-display.asp?r--74.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. Compare United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (11 th Cir. 2003) (upholding
restrictions based on "the strong link between child pornography and the Internet"), with United
States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting prohibitions on Internet access
because of the "virtually indispensible" nature of the Internet in today's world (internal quotation
marks omitted)). See also discussion infra Parts I.B-C.
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public and rehabilitating the offender. 19 Some circuits have rejected broadly
banning an offender from computers and Internet use, whereas other circuits
have upheld broad restrictions, or even a complete ban, based on public safety
concerns and deterrence.
20
Recently, some state legislatures have passed legislation that requires courts
to implement certain computer and Internet restrictions for convicted sex
offenders. 21 However, these laws ultimately strip courts of their discretion and
limit judges' ability to fashion individual sentences based on the circumstances
22
surrounding each offender. Without the capacity to provide individualized
sentences to sex offenders, courts cannot effectively carry out their traditional
roles of balancing competing rights and interests. 23 In states without
legislatively mandated conditions, some courts have used their discretion to
issue narrowly tailored Internet restrictions; however, other courts have
imposed overly broad restrictions that effectively ban a sex offender to the
same extent as would an all-encompassing piece of legislation.
24
This Comment examines the different standards that federal appellate
courts25 have applied in reviewing challenges to restrictions on sex offenders'
19. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 5 (acknowledging that although the potential
abuses of the Internet are particularly dangerous to the public, it is also clear that computers are
an important resource in reintegrating offenders back into the community).
20. Compare United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(rejecting a broad ban on computer and Internet use as excessive, overbroad, and unnecessary),
with United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a complete ban on
computer and Internet use for the purposes of deterrence and public protection). See also Susan
S. Kreston, Emerging Issues in Internet Child Pornography Cases: Balancing Acts, J. INTERNET
L., June 2006, at 22, 29 (2006) (discussing the differing approaches to computer and Internet
restrictions).
21. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.6 (West Supp. 2008).
22. See id. ("In the case of a person who has been convicted ... of a sex offense ... the
court shall ... order the following Internet access conditions .... ); Kreston, supra note 20, at 29
(discussing how courts have looked to both the nature of the sexual offenders' crimes as well as
their employment history in deciding whether to impose complete bans on Internet access).
23. See Kreston, supra note 20, at 31 (In many areas of law "courts are called upon to strike
a balance between competing rights and interests. It is only when such balances are accurately
struck, giving proper weight to not only particular facts of the case, but also according both
research and policy their place in the equation, can justice be readily done .... ").
24. Compare United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (overturning a
restriction as overly broad where alternative methods, such as supervised Internet use, would be
sufficient to balance the interests between the defendant's rights and protecting the public), with
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (prohibiting the defendant from
accessing the Internet without prior approval from his probation officer).
25. This Comment focuses solely on the split concerning Internet restrictions among federal
circuits and will not discuss state court holdings on the subject. However, similar to the statutory
factors laid in § 3553(a), most state courts hold that "when imposing a sentence, the judge should
consider several goals: punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation."
Commonwealth v. Power, 650 N.E.2d 87, 90 (Mass. 1995). Despite these factors, many state
appellate courts have upheld fairly broad Internet restrictions imposed upon the offender by lower
courts upon supervised release. See, e.g., State v. Wardle, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Idaho Ct. App.
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computer and Internet access as a condition of supervised release or probation.
In Part I.A, this Comment reviews the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that set
the standard for sentencing courts and provide judges wide discretion to
impose the terms of supervised release. Parts I.B and I.C explore how
different circuits have applied the Sentencing Guidelines and evaluates the
opinions which have led to a multi-jurisdictional split regarding the limitations
and scope of restricting sex offenders' computer and Internet access. Part I.D
reviews how certain states have attempted to take the problem into their own
hands through legislation. In Part II, this Comment examines the justifications
for the various federal appellate courts' holdings and analyzes the
constitutional and policy ramifications of setting restrictions that are either too
narrow or too broad in scope. Finally, in Part III, this Comment proposes that
states should permit courts to engage in a case-by-case determination rather
than requiring a one-size-fits-all law that fails to take into account the unique
factors of each individual offender.
1. FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES IN RESTRICTING COMPUTER USE AND
INTERNET ACCESS AS A "SPECIAL CONDITION" TO SUPERVISED RELEASE
A. Sentencing Guidelines: Broad Discretion Leads to Mixed Results
The digitization of America and the proliferation of the Internet have created
new challenges for courts attempting to balance deterrence and public safety
objectives argainst an offender's liberty interests and rehabilitative
capabilities. Many courts and supervising agencies have increasingly
imposed conditions that restrict computer use and Internet access for convicted
sex offenders upon their supervised release. 27 While these conditions have
generally been carried out "without the benefit of clear legal guidance from
higher courts or legislative bodies, ' 28 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines create
a set of uniform sentencing rules to be applied throughout all federal courts.
29
2002) (upholding a ban on computers in the defendant's home as reasonably related to his battery
offense, despite the fact that the government could not prove sexual intent); State v. Combs, 10
P.3d 1101, 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a complete prohibition on computer use was
reasonable and necessary "during the 24 month community placement period" to protect the
public from repetition of the defendant's heinous crimes, in which he displayed pornographic
images to five and six year old girls, and then forced them to engage in the same actions).
26. See Brian W. McKay, Comment, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway:
Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 203, 203-04
(2003) (proposing that "courts should not adopt a per se rule against complete Internet bans").
27. See id at 204.
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL Ch. 1, Pt. A, at 12-13 (2008); Christopher Wiest, Comment, The Netsurfing Split:
Restrictions Imposed on Internet and Computer Usage by Those Convicted of a Crime Involving
a Computer, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 847, 848-49 (2003). It is important to note that in United States
v. Booker, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines could no
longer be mandatory and ruled that they were now merely "advisory." 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
2009]
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The Guidelines not only provide a baseline for the proper period of
incarceration, 30 but also allow a court to impose a term of supervised release
and grant them the discretionary authority to fashion special conditions of such
supervision. 3 1 This authority allows courts to impose various computer use
and Internet access restrictions on a sexual offender when he is released from
prison.
32
Despite having wide discretion, a federal judge's authority to set the specific
conditions of a sex offender's supervised release is subject to the requirements
and limiting factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). However, § 3583(d)
also permits a judge to set conditions of release as long as those conditions are
"reasonably related" to the factors described in § 3553(a)(1)-(2), and "to the
extent that such conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or
property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in Section
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b).
31. Id. § 3583(c); see also McKay, supra note 26, at 219-20; Wiest, supra note 29, at 849.
At sentencing, the defendant may receive "supervised release, parole, or probation," in
descending order of severity. Kreston, supra note 20, at 29. While a defendant may be sentenced
to parole or probation without having to serve any period of incarceration, supervised release may
only be ordered upon completion of some period of incarceration. See id.
32. See McKay, supra note 26, at 219-21. Similar to probation, "[s]upervised release is a
form of government supervision [that follows] a term of imprisonment," and requires several
mandatory and discretionary conditions depending on the crime. Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha &
Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REv. 267, 269, 276-82 (1996). A defendant's period
of supervised release begins immediately after the term of incarceration, however, if any imposed
conditions are violated, the defendant may be returned to prison. Id. at 270. An appellate court
follows the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the conditions of supervised release set
by the district court. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005). In order to
impose conditions of supervised release relating to Internet and computer use, such conditions
must be "sufficiently related" to at least some of the factors in the Guidelines. United States v.
Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 697-99 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he items listed in [the Guidelines] aren't
necessarily elements, each of which has to be present. They are merely factors to be weighed,
and the conditions imposed may be unrelated to one or more factors, so long as they are
sufficiently related to others.").
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (setting forth "explicit conditions of supervised released"); see also
Crume, 422 F.3d at 732-33 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) limits a judge's discretion to
determine conditions of a supervised release). Section 3 583(d) also permits a court to order any
conditions "reasonably related" to the sentencing factors described in § 3553(a)(l)-(2). 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d). The sentencing factors a district court must consider are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational and vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner ....
Id. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
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3553(a)(2).,, 34 As explained in a 1984 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, the
primary goal of supervised release is not to incapacitate and punish, but rather
"to ease the defendant's transition into the community . . . or to provide
rehabilitation . . . after release." 35 Accordingly, when implementing special
conditions of supervised release, courts must consider the goals of sentencing
to ensure that the release conditions are reasonable in relation to the offense
36
committed, and are designed to help the offender reenter society.
Although the Guidelines provide parameters for sentencing and releasing,
several appellate courts have reached differing conclusions under the
Guidelines with respect to a sex offender's access to the Internet upon
release.37 A circuit split has formed with the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits on one side, and the Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits on the other.38 Some courts have determined that a sex offender may
be completely prohibited from computers and Internet access as a condition of
release, 39 while other courts have opted for a more narrow approach, solely
restricting a sex offender's access to specific websites.4 ° However, the most
common restrictions utilize the probation officer as an administrator by
granting the offender access to the Internet only with the probation officer's
41prior approval.
34. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), provides:
The Commission ... shall promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States
and to the United States Probation System-
(2) general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any
other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the
Commission would further the purposes set forth in [18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)].
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
35. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see also Frank E. Correll, Jr., Note, "You Fall into Scylla in
Seeking to Avoid Charybdis ": The Second Circuit's Pragmatic Approach to Supervised Release
for Sex Offenders, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 688, 703 (2007) ("The goals and objectives of
supervised release imply that the value of a release program as a rehabilitative tool mirrors the
extent to which the conditions of supervised release simulate life after the program's end.").
37. Compare United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 170 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding an
absolute ban on computer and Internet access as reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(d)), with United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003) (vacating the district
court's special release condition that forbid the defendant from possessing a computer or using
any online computer service because the restriction "unreasonably impinges upon [the offender's]
liberty interests").
38. See infra Part I.B-C.
39. See, e.g., Paul, 274 F.3d at 170.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a
condition which prevented the offender from using the Internet without the approval of his
probation officer "inflict[ed] a greater deprivation on [offender's] liberty than [wa]s reasonably
necessary," and that "a more focused restriction" was needed).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
forbidding the defendant Internet access without prior approval from his probation officer "[did]
2009]
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The division among the circuits reflects the fact that the courts are being
asked to reconcile statutory goals that are broad and, at times, contradictory.
42
For example, some courts view the Internet as so indispensible that a condition
prohibiting use of the Internet would be unreasonable. 43 Other courts,
however, are mainly concerned with the "the strong link between child
pornography and the Internet, and the need to protect the public.' '44 Still, some
courts have refused to adopt either of those positions, and instead consider the
statutory goals on a case-by-case basis to determine the proper balance
between an offender's Internet access and public safety.45
B. A Restrictive Approach: Circuits that Endorse a Complete or Broad
Prohibition
1. A Total Prohibition on Computer Use and Internet Access
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Paul, established a precedent for a
46complete ban on computer use and Internet access. The defendant, Ronald
Scott Paul, "was sentenced to five years of imprisonment and three years of
supervised release" following his guilty plea to "knowingly possessing child
pornography. ' 47 Paul challenged the conditions of his supervised release,
not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary for the [statutory] purpose
because it is not absolute"); see also Kreston, supra note 20, at 29 ("The most common restriction
uses the probation officer as an overseer of the defendant's use, often allowing unannounced
inspections of the defendant's computer for child pornography images or requiring permission of
the probation officer before Internet access is allowed." (footnote omitted)). By permitting
probation officers to make subjective decisions regarding computer and Internet usage, some have
argued that this probation officer exception seemingly creates further legal issues in itself. See
Wiest, supra note 29, at 867. Because the judiciary is granted the authority to impose special
restrictions, without specific authorization from Congress, the imposition of such conditions by a
probation officer may be an impermissible delegation of power from Congress to the executive
branch. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)). While this
issue is not without importance, it will not be discussed in this Comment.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (establishing sentencing goals that must be
considered in every case).
43. See, e.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126-27.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting a middle
ground approach "between the need to ensure that [the defendant] never again uses the
Worldwide Web for illegal purposes and the need to allow him to function in the modem world").
46. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2001). Other courts have
reached similar conclusions on restrictive conditions for sex offenders. See, e.g., United States v.
Granger, 17 F. App'x 247, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (upholding a computer and
Internet restriction similar to that in Paul).
47. Paul, 274 F.3d at 157. Paul's collection of child pornography and other disturbing items
were lawfully seized after he took his personal computer to a local computer repair shop. Id at
158. The technician working on his computer discovered the photos, notified the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and the FBI conducted a valid search of the defendant's home. Id. The
most disturbing item seized by FBI agents was a medical bag containing flyers written in Spanish
that advertised lice removal for children. Id The flyers stated that the defendant "would conduct
[Vol. 58:779
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"argu[ing] that the condition ... prohibiting him from having, possessing, or
having access to 'computers, the Internet, photographic equipment,
audio/video equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image' [was]
unreasonably broad. ' '48 Paul argued that a complete ban on his computer use
and Internet access could not be upheld merely because he pled guilty to an
Intemet-related crime,49 contending that such a restriction would prohibit him
from using "computers and the Internet for legitimate purposes, such as word
processing and research." 50 The court disagreed and held that "the supervised
release condition . . , is reasonably related to Paul's offense and to the need to
prevent recidivism and protect the public."'"
Relying on the Third Circuit's reasoning in United States v. Crandon,52 the
Fifth Circuit in Paul upheld the complete ban on computer and Internet access
as "reasonably necessary to protect the public and prevent recidivism."53 The
Fifth Circuit also rejected the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in United States v.
White,54 and denounced the idea that an all-encompassing restriction is per se
a complete physical examination on each child for 'overall health,' which necessarily required the
children to completely undress." Id.
48. Id. at 167. The court noted that it "interpret[ed] this 'overbreadth' claim to argue that
the supervised release condition [was] inappropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) because it
involve[d] a greater deprivation of liberty than [was] reasonably necessary in light of the need to
protect the public and prevent recidivism." Id. at 167 n. 14.
49. Id at 168.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 169. The prosecution provided significant evidence against Paul, including a
substantial amount of child pornography stored on his computer, proof that he communicated
with others about sexually explicit content via the Internet, and verification that, through e-mail,
he directed others how to "'scout' single, dysfunctional parents and gain access to their children."
Id. at 168.
52. 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). In Crandon, the defendant "used the Internet as a means to
develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl over a period of several months," and, in
that instance, the Third Circuit held that the district court's condition restricting Internet access
was reasonably related to the defendant's criminal activities, to the goal of deterring him from
engaging in further criminal conduct, and to protecting the public. Id. at 127.
53. Paul, 274 F.3d at 168-69. The Fifth Circuit found there was no abuse of discretion even
though the restrictions in Crandon contained a proviso permitting the defendant to use computer
resources with the approval of his probation officer, a condition not present in Paul's supervised
release. Id. at 167-68.
54. 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). In White, where the defendant was convicted of
receiving child pornography, the Tenth Circuit held that an attempt to deny Internet access
altogether "is 'greater than necessary,' [under] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and fails to balance the
competing interests the sentencing court must consider." Id. at 1206. The Tenth Circuit
distinguished White's facts from those in Crandon, and noted that in Crandon, where the
defendant clearly used the Internet as a means to meet and exploit a young girl, he "clearly
initiated and facilitated a pattern of criminal conduct and victimization that produced an
immediate consequence and directly injured the victim." Id. at 1205.
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unreasonable merely because it might prohibit a defendant from "get[ing] a
weather forecast or ... read[ing] a newspaper online. 55
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has also concluded that a complete ban on
computer use and Internet access is an appropriate condition of supervised
release for a sex offender.56 In United States v. Granger, the Fourth Circuit
upheld a broad condition of supervised release that required the defendant to
"not possess or use any computer which [was] connected or ha[d] the capacity
to be connected to any network.,
57
The defendant, Michael Wayne Granger, pled guilty to "transporting and
shipping images of child pornography" that had been downloaded and saved
on his computer. 58 Granger was sentenced to fifteen years of incarceration,
followed by a three-year term of supervised release.5 On appeal, Granger
contended that the special condition restricting his computer and Internet use
was overly broad and, as a practical matter, would "effectively prevent[] [him]
from earning a living at any occupation where he might have to access a
computer, including a job such as [a] cashier."60
In response, the Fourth Circuit offered three reasons for upholding the
condition, independent of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning given in Paul.6I First,
the restrictions should not affect his ability to obtain meaningful employment
because much of Granger's prior employment had primarily involved physical
62labor and required neither access to computers nor the Internet. Second,
because Granger would be "required to 'work at a job which [was] pre-
approved by [his] probation officer,"' there would be no doubt as to whether
55. Paul, 274 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White, 244 F.3d at
1205).
56. United States v. Granger, 117 F. App'x 247, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. Numerous images of child pornography, including many with Granger sexually
involved with his six-year-old daughter and seven-year-old stepdaughter, were discovered on
Granger's personal computer after his co-worker informed the authorities that Granger possessed
the illicit images. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 248-49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
61. See id. at 249. The Fifth Circuit in Paul made several references to the "dual statutory
goals of protecting the public and preventing future criminal activity." United States v. Paul, 274
F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Granger made no direct
reference to these statutory goals or to the Paul decision. Granger, 117 F. App'x at 249.
62. Granger, 117 F. App'x at 249. The Fourth Circuit distinguished Granger's
circumstances from those of the defendant in United States v. Holm, a Seventh Circuit decision
finding that a complete ban on computer and Internet use was unreasonable due to the defendant's
thirty-year history of work in a computer-driven industry and the difficulty he would face in
finding "gainful employment in the computer field upon his release." 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th
Cir. 2003). Although the Fourth Circuit did not mention Paul, work history was also relevant in
Paul where the Fifth Circuit noted that Paul had worked primarily as a truck driver, and made no
specific objection to the computer and Internet bans affecting his employment. Paul, 274 F.3d at
170 & n.17.
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any potential employment opportunities would violate the special conditions of
63his supervised release. Third, the court noted that if the expansion of
computer technology in fifteen years is so great as to severely impact a worker
of Granger's skills and training, he would be able to seek a modification of this
special condition after his release.
64
2. A General Affirmation of Broad Internet Bans
While the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have not yet upheld a
complete ban on computer use and Internet access, these circuits have
permitted significant restrictions on a sex offender's Internet access based
largely on the need to protect the public.66 In the Ninth Circuit decision United
States v. Rearden, for example, the defendant Chance Rearden was convicted
of shipping child pornography over the Internet and was sentenced to fifty-one
months imprisonment, followed by a specified term of supervised release.
67
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conditions of his supervised release that
prohibited the possession or use of a computer with access to the Internet at
any location without prior approval from his probation officer.68 In so holding,
the court pointed out that "a number of circuits have upheld similar restrictions
on a convicted sex offender's use of the Internet." 69 While also acknowledging
that other courts have held conversely, 70 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
63. Granger, 117F. App'x at 249.
64. Id. (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) permits a district court to alter the conditions of
release in the event of "unforeseen circumstances").
65. See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting the
defendant's Internet access to that approved by the Probation Office); United States v. Ristine,
335 F.3d 692, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding the district court's sentence permitting
computer use with probation officer permission and no access to the Internet); United States v.
Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11 th Cir. 2003) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's
order limiting Internet use to purposes acceptable to the defendant's probation officer).
66. See, e.g., Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093 (recognizing the "concomitant dangers of the Internet
and the need to protect both the public and sex offenders themselves from its potential abuses").
67. Rearden, 349 F.3d at 611-12. Rearden was discovered after frequently corresponding
with another sex offender, David Settlemyer, who, in November 2000, began cooperating with
federal authorities to bring down other sex offenders like Rearden. Id. Communication between
the two began in July 2000, when Rearden expressed interest in a chat room message that
advertised "'snuff films of little children' and inquir[ed] whether anyone was interested in 'raping
and ravaging' [Settlemyer's] three nieces, ages sixteen, fourteen, and eight." Id. at 611. In
December 2000, Rearden sent Settlemyer an e-mail containing three pornographic websites and
fifteen child pornographic images. Id. at 612. Consequently, authorities arrested Rearden on
February 23, 2001. Id.
68. Id. at621-22.
69. Id. (citing Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696; Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093; United States v. Paul, 274
F.3d 155, 169-70 (5th Cir. 2001)).
70. Id. at 621 (citing United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d
Cir. 2002)).
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Rearden's Internet restriction was reasonably related to his offense and to the
important goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protecting the public.
71
In United States v. Zinn, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar rationale in
upholding a broad Internet restriction as a condition of supervised release
where the defendant had pled guilty to possessing images of child pornography
that had been transported in interstate commerce. While the court recognized
that "the Internet has become an important resource for information,
communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses," it ultimately concluded
that the opportunity for misuse-evident from the facts of this case-justified
fairly extensive computer and Internet restrictions. 73  As in Rearden, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the restriction in this case did not risk being overly
broad because of the "probation officer exception" included in the condition. 74
In addition, the Eighth Circuit has also upheld fairly broad Internet
restrictions in two cases dealing with sex offenders. In United States v. Fields,
where the defendant pled guilty to selling child pornography, 5 and in United
States v. Ristine, where the defendant pled guilty to receiving child
pornography, 76 the Eighth Circuit cited two justifications for its decision to
uphold the defendants' computer and Internet restrictions. 77 First, the court
stated that "there was evidence that the defendant did more than merely
possess child pornography." 78 Second, the court explained that the computer
71. Rearden, 349 F.3d at 621 (describing Rearden's offense as one that "involved e-mail
transmissions of quite graphic child pornography"). The court also held that the condition did not
impermissibly infringe on the defendant's liberty rights because these rights are not absolute, but
allowed for limited Internet access if approved by his probation officer. Id
72. Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1086, 1092-93.
73. Id. at 1093. Defendant Karl Zinn solicited two pornographic videotapes depicting girls
under the age of thirteen from an undercover U.S. Customs Service website designed to catch
sexual predators. Id. at 1086. When the two videotapes arrived at Zinn's home as part of a
controlled delivery, Customs agents executed a search warrant and recovered computer disks
containing over 4000 images of child pornography. Id.
74. Id. at 1093. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Walser in holding that this was a "relatively narrowly-tailored condition [which] 'readily
accomplishes the goal of restricting use of the Internet and more delicately balances the
protection of the public with the goals of sentencing."' Id. (quoting United States v. Walser, 275
F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001)).
75. United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003). After the defendant pled
guilty to one count of selling child pornography, the district court sentenced him to fifty-seven
months in prison, followed by a three-year term of supervised release under special conditions
that restricted his use of computers and the Internet. Id.
76. United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 2003). Defendant Scott Ristine
was sentenced to twenty-seven months of imprisonment with three years of supervised release
subject to a condition that restricted his use of photographic equipment, computers, and the
Internet. Id
77. See id at 696; Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027.
78. Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696; see also Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027 (noting that selling child
pornography is a more serious offense than simply possessing the material). Ristine's crimes
were discovered after he attempted to purchase a catalog of videotapes "featuring boys and girls
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restrictions were not absolute bans on computer use because both defendants
were permitted to use computers (but were not allowed access to the Internet)
with prior approval from their probation officers.79
C. A Liberal Approach: Circuits that Endorse Narrowly Tailored Internet
Restrictions
1. The Second Circuit: Adamantly Opposed to Broad Internet Bans
Not all circuits have elected to uphold such severe and all-encompassin§
computer and Internet restrictions like those approved in Paul and Granger.
The Second Circuit, in particular, has been adamantly opposed to such
widespread restrictions on an offenders' computer use and Internet access.81
While several other circuits have agreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning in
82 83
certain circumstances, no other circuit seems to take as fervent an approach.
under age ten engaging in sexual acts." Ristine, 335 F.3d at 693. A subsequent search by the
police revealed "thousands of child pornography images that he downloaded from the Internet
and ... exchang[ed] .. .with other Internet users." Id. Fields was discovered after he created
"lolitagurls.com," a website that generated revenue of over $22,000 from "provid[ing] subscribers
access to 'hard to find' and 'shocking' nude pictures of 'girls between the ages of 12-17."'
Fields, 324 F.3d at 1026.
79. Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696; Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027. Two years later, the Eighth Circuit
reversed a similar condition of supervised release as a greater deprivation of liberty than
reasonably necessary; however, this case was distinguished on the grounds that the defendant did
no more than "merely possess child pornography," and thus a more narrowly tailored restriction
was appropriate. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that one
of the main considerations for upholding broad restrictions in Ristine and Fields was that "the
defendant[s] used [the] computer and the Internet to do more than merely possess child
pornography"). Use of the word "merely" by the courts has alarmed some commentators when it
is used by the courts to refer to "the concept of possession of images of child pornography."
Kreston, supra note 20, at 30. These commentators argue that this language portrays the
"possession of child pornography [as] a victimless crime." Id. However, this cannot be the case
because a child somewhere was obviously used to produce the explicit images possessed by the
offender. See id
80. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001).
81. See, e.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124 (holding that a condition of supervised release
prohibiting the defendant from accessing a computer or the Internet without his probation
officer's approval inflicted a greater deprivation on the defendant's liberty than was reasonably
necessary).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on
Sofsky to declare a complete restriction on the defendant's computer use or Internet access
without probation officer approval as excessively broad).
83. Compare Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126-27 (holding that placing a restriction on Sofsky's
computer and Internet use is a greater deprivation on his liberty than was reasonably necessary as
the Government has the ability to randomly check Sofsky's computer without notice to determine
whether he was using it at all as well as what he was using it for), with Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392
(noting that while a total ban on computer and Internet use was not appropriate in this case, the
court would not hesitate to impose such a restriction in the future when it has been determined
that the defendant has used the Internet in the past to contact children).
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In United States v. Peterson, defendant Larry Peterson pled guilty to bank
larceny and was sentenced to five years probation with conditions based in part
on a prior, unrelated incest sex-offense conviction. 84 The district court
imposed conditions broadly prohibiting Peterson from possessing or using
computers or the Intemet.8 On appeal, Peterson argued that this restriction
was not reasonably related to "the 'nature and circumstances of the [larceny]
offense' or [his] 'history and characteristics,"' nor were they 'reasonably
necessary' to the broad sentencing purposes indicated in [18 U.S.C.] §
3553(a)(2).,,86 The government argued that the "restrictions were reasonably
related to Peterson's prior incest conviction[,]" however, the Second Circuit
was not persuaded.87
In rejecting the government's argument, the Second Circuit relied on United
States v. White and highlighted the fact that computers and the Intemet have
become "virtually indispensable" in today's modem society. 89 By analogy, the
court suggested that a total Intemet ban would be just as inappropriate as an
absolute ban on the use of telephones as a condition of release for the crime of
using a telephone to commit fraud. 90 In the court's view, the restriction was
excessive, overbroad, and unnecessary to protect the public given the lack of
evidence that Peterson's prior incest offense was in any way related to the
Internet. 9I Moreover, the court asserted that the condition imposed constituted
an "occupational restriction" by definitely prohibiting the use of technology
that Peterson might need in a job which involved computers. 92  Because
84. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001). The restrictions on Peterson's
Internet access stemmed from his prior incest conviction, his continued viewing of adult
pornography, and the "probation officer's finding that [he] 'pose[d] a great risk to the
community."' Id. (alteration in original).
85. Id. (restricting Peterson's ability to possess or use computers or the Internet, requiring
him to enter a mental health program for the treatment of "sexual predators", and requiring him to
notify third parties (e.g., potential employers) of his prior sex offense conviction as well as his
bank larceny conviction).
86. Id. at 82 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3563(b) (2000)).
87. Id. at 82-83. The Second Circuit held that the restrictions were overly extensive
because they completely prevented the defendant from "possessing or using a computer that
includes either a modem, an Internet account, a mass storage device, or a writable or re-writable
CD Rom." Id. at 83.
88. 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that a complete ban on computer use
would "bar [the defendant] from using a computer at the library to do any research, get a weather
forecast, or read a newspaper online").
89. Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83.
90. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that the defendant's propensity for pornography did
not justify a ban on all books, magazines, and newspapers simply because he might use them to
facilitate his addiction. Id.
91. Id The items banned by the condition included: "a modem; Internet account; writable
or re-writable CD Rom; tape backup or removable mass storage device; device/appliance that can
be used to connect to the Internet; digital camera; [and] CDs (other than original manufacturer's
software distribution)." Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id. at 83.
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Peterson had a history of employment that required the use of computers,
including his own business, the court considered these to be further
justifications for deeming the restriction unreasonably broad.93
The Second Circuit again rejected conditions imposing a complete ban on
Internet access in United States v. Sofsky, a case with even more aggravating
factors. 94 Defendant Gregory Sofsky received a ten-year and one month prison
sentence as well as a period of supervised release after he entered a guilty plea
to the charge of receiving child pornography.95 Upon reviewing the conditions
of Sofsky's supervised release, the Second Circuit held that "[a]lthough the
condition prohibiting Sofsky from accessing a computer or the Internet without
his probation officer's approval is reasonably related to the purposes of his
sentencing, in light of the nature of this offense, . . . the condition inflicts a
greater deprivation of [his] liberty than is reasonably necessary." 96 The court
noted that it had previously considered a similar sentencing condition in
Peterson, and still found the telephone analogy in Peterson to be persuasive.
97
The court rejected the government's argument that permitting such access
would facilitate the continuation of electronically receiving child
pornography. 98 The court again relied on United States v. White and held that
"[a] total ban on Internet access prevents [the] use of e-mail, an increasingly
93. Id at 84; cf United States v. Granger, 117 F. App'x 247, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (upholding a broad computer and Internet restriction where the great majority of
defendant's work involved manual labor and not computer technology).
94. United States v. Sotksy, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002).
95. Id. at 123-24. After the prosecution put forth substantial evidence that Sofsky used the
Internet to obtain thousands of child pornographic images, Sofsky entered a guilty plea. Id. at
124.
96. Id. at 126.
97. Id. ("[A]lthough a defendant might use the telephone to commit fraud, this would not
justify a condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the use of telephones." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83)). The court went on to note that the
"same could be said of a prohibition on the use of the mails imposed on a defendant convicted of
mail fraud." Id.
98. Id. The court also rejected the government's argument that a broad restriction was the
only practically enforceable restriction. Id. at 126-27 (noting that narrower restrictions to
Sofsky's Internet access, such as random hard drive monitoring, would be more appropriate). Six
months after Sofsky, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Carlson, reiterated its apprehension
for onerous computer and Internet restrictions. United States v. Carlson, 47 F. App'x 598, 599
(2d Cir. 2002) (vacating and remanding the conditions imposed by the district court in light of
Sofsky). In that case, defendant Stanley Carlson pled guilty to possession of child pornography
and was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment and three years of supervised release upon the
condition that he not "possess, purchase or use a computer (including any Internet services) or
computer equipment and is prohibited from using any commercial computer systems/service."
Id. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted). In vacating the conditions imposed on Carlson by
the district court, the Second Circuit noted that the restrictions were even more severe than those
overturned in Sofsky. Id. at 599.
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
widely used form of communication and . .. prevents other common-place
computer uses."
99
2. A General Disapproval of Broad Internet Bans
While the Third Circuit has upheld a broad restriction in the often-cited case
United States v. Crandon, 10° it generally prefers the kind of minimal
restrictions expressed by the Second Circuit in Sofsky. For example, in United
States v. Freeman, the restriction at issue forbid the defendant, who had pled
guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography, from possessing any
computer in his home or using any online computer service without prior
approval from his probation officer.' 0' Relying on Sofsky, the court noted that
"there is no need to cut off Freeman's access to email or benign internet usage
when a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can
be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on Freeman's hard
drive or removable disks."' 0 2 The court acknowledged that in Crandon it had
previously allowed a condition restricting all Internet access, 1° 3 but the court
distinguished those facts, noting that "the defendant in Crandon used the
internet to contact young children and solicit inappropriate sexual contact with
them. Such use of the internet is harmful to the victims contacted and more
difficult to trace than simply using the internet to view pornographic web
sites." °4 Here, because no evidence indicated that Freeman had used the
Internet to contact young children, the court held that it was not reasonably
necessary to restrict all access when a more limited restriction was available.
10 5
Similar to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has appeared willing to
impose some restrictions, but has also expressed concern that severe
99. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (citing United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir.
2001)).
100. 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a condition restricting Internet access as
reasonably related to the defendant's criminal activities and the goals of deterrence and protecting
the public, where the defendant employed the Internet to cultivate an inappropriate sexual
relationship with a minor over an extensive period of time).
101. United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2003). Similar to Rearden, a
convicted child molester assisted a U.S. Customs Service agent by urging Freeman to share and
transport child pornography images. Id. at 387.
102. Id. at 392.
103. Id. (citing Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125-26).
104. Id.
105. Id. The court also recognized that its holding would in no way limit its ability to impose
broader restrictions (such as in Crandon) "when a defendant has a past history of using the
internet to contact children," or if Freeman did not abide by the limited conditions. Id. In 2007,
the Third Circuit reiterated its lack of tolerance for overly broad restrictions in United States v.
Voelker, when it struck down a condition that imposed a lifetime ban on computer use and
Internet access for a defendant who pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. 489 F.3d 139,
143-44 (3d Cir. 2007). The court noted that it had yet to uphold such an absolute ban, and that
the Crandon decision (which involved a greater offense) had "imposed the most severe restriction
on computer and internet use... thus far." Id. at 145.
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restrictions fail to account for the importance of the Internet in modem daily
life. 106 In United States v. Holm, defendant Delbert Holm pled guilty to
possession of child pornography, and as a post-prison release condition, was
prohibited from possessing or using a computer with Internet access. 107 While
it recognized the rationale behind an all-encompassing restriction, the court
noted that such an extensive prohibition "renders modem life.., exceptionally
difficult."' 0 8 As a result, the court remanded the case so that the district court
could order more "precise restrictions that protect the child-victims," while
simultaneously reflecting the prospects for Holm's rehabilitation.'
0 9
The Tenth Circuit has also issued holdings that stress the need for narrowly
tailored conditions in today's technological society. Particularly, in United
States v. White, the Tenth Circuit overturned a condition requiring that the
defendant "shall not possess a computer with Internet access throughout his
period of supervised release."' 10 The court found that if the condition was
interpreted literally, it was simultaneously both under- and over-inclusive."'
As worded, the condition did not prohibit access to the Internet in libraries,
cybercaf6s, and other locales, and thus was not reasonably related to
prohibiting the defendant from all access to the Internet.1 12 At the same time,
the condition was "greater than necessary" because it prevented the defendant
from using the Internet for truly legitimate means, and therefore failed to
balance the competing interests described in the Guidelines.
1 3
106. See, e.g., United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003).
107. Id. at 874. Holm's actions were uncovered when an anonymous complaint informed
authorities that he "was in possession of a large amount of child pornography." Id.
108. Id. at 877-88. As examples of how modem life would be exceptionally difficult, the
court noted that "the government strongly encourages taxpayers to file their returns electronically,
[that] more and more commerce is conducted on-line, [and that] vast amounts of government
information are communicated via website[s]." Id. at 878.
109. Id. at 879. The court suggested that the imposition of conditions requiring random
searches of Holm's computer and residence, as well as filtering software, would more
appropriately balance the need to protect the public with Holm's need for computers and the
Intemet. Id.
110. United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2001). Robert White pled
guilty to receiving child pornography after responding to an online advertisement placed by U.S.
Customs officers for videos of young girls engaged in sexual fondling and intercourse with adult
men. Id. at 1202. He was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison, followed by three years of
supervised release. Id.
111. Id. at 1205-06.
112. Id. at 1204-O5.
113. Id. at 1206 (noting the interests courts are required to consider under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)). The Tenth Circuit, in explaining why the condition was greater than necessary, noted
that if the condition was interpreted in a broad manner, White would be barred from "using a
computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online." Id.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit subsequently upheld a similar Internet restriction in United States
v. Walser, but noted that the condition of release was not as "ill-tailored" as the one at issue in
White. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001). Because the condition in
Walser allowed for Internet access with approval from the defendant's probation officer, the court
20091
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D. A Legislative Approach: How Some States Have Taken the Matter into
Their Own Hands
As abuse and victimization through the Internet becomes increasingly
prevalent, some states have sought to tighten their control over convicted sex
offenders by drafting legislation that mandates Internet restrictions for those on
supervised release or probation. 114 While Nevada115 and Florida116 have
enacted such legislation, New Jersey is the state with the most recent and most
severe law mandating computer and Internet restrictions as a sentencing
condition. 117
As of December 2007, New Jersey state law1 8 requires courts to limit
Internet access for individuals who are required under federal law to register
with state authorities as a sex offender, 119 are on community supervision for
life, or on probation or parole under state law. 12  The conditions of the New
Jersey statute:
(1) [p]rohibit the person from accessing or using a computer or
any other device with Internet capability without the prior written
approval of the court... ;
(2) [r]equire the person to submit to periodic unannounced
examinations of the person's computer or any other device with
Internet access by [the appropriate official];
(3) [r]equire the person to submit to the installation on the
person's computer or device with Internet capability, at the person's
expense, one or more hardware or software systems to monitor the
Internet use; and
found that the condition better responded to the rehabilitative goal of sentencing while "more
delicate[ly] balanc[ing]" the need to restrict Internet access with the need to protect the public.
Id.
114. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(1)(h) (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
176A.410 (l)(q) (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-2, 2C:43-6.6 (West Supp. 2008).
115. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176A.410(l)(q) (mandating that "if a defendant is
convicted of a sexual offense and the court grants probation or suspends the sentence, the court
shall . . . order as a condition of probation or suspension of sentence that the defendant ... not
possess any electronic device capable of accessing the Internet and not access the Internet through
any such device or any other means, unless possession of such device or access is approved by
the parole and probation officer assigned to the defendant").
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(l)(h) ("[T]he court must impose the following conditions
... (h) a prohibition on accessing the Internet or other computer services until the offender's sex
offender treatment program, after a risk assessment is completed, approves and implements a
safety plan for the offender's accessing or using the Internet or other computer services.").
117. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-2,2C:43-6.6.
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a), (e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (allowing the states to release
personal information of sex offenders when "necessary to protect the public"); see also Megan's
Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
120. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-2, 2C:43-6.6.
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(4) [r]equire the person to submit to any other appropriate
restrictions concerning the person's use or access of a computer or
any other device with Internet capability.'
2
'
Anyone who violates the statute's conditions is guilty of a crime under New
Jersey law.
122
In addition, some state legislatures have attempted to mitigate the growing
threat of online predators by directly regulating specific Internet and website
activities. 123 For example, Minnesota and New York lawmakers have been
considering legislation that would bar sex offenders from accessing local
networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook. 124 Similarly, on October 13,
2008, the United States Congress passed the Keeping the Internet Devoid of
Sexual Predators Act of 2008 (KIDS Act), which requires sex offenders to
provide Internet identifiers, such as e-mail addresses and other self-
identification designations, to a national sex offender registry.' 5 The KIDS
Act also requires the Justice Department to establish and maintain a system
that allows social networking websites to compare the Internet identifiers of its
users with those provided to the National Sex Offender Registry. 26  If the
system finds a match, the Attorney General must provide the social networking
website with information related to the identity of the individual.
127
On the same day that President Bush signed the KIDS Act into law, he also
signed into law the "PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008". 128 This law
requires the Department of Justice to create and implement a National Strategy
for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction; establishes by statute the
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force Program; and amends
federal child pornography laws.' 
29
121. Id. § 2C:43-6.6(a)(1)-(4).
122. Id. § 2C:43-6.6(b).
123. See Trymaine Lee, Bill Would Bar Sex Offenders From Facebook and MySpace, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at B4; Bob Collins, No Sex Offenders Allowed, March 12, 2008,
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/specia/lcolumns/news-cut/archive/2008/03/no-sexo
ffenders allowed.shtml.
124. See Lee, supra note 123 (New York proposition); Collins, supra note 123 (Minnesota
proposition). Under these laws, "all registered sex offenders [would be required] to submit any e-
mail addresses and other Internet identifiers, such as screen names used for instant messaging," to
local law enforcement offices, which would then share these identifiers with social networking
sites and allow them to block access. Lee, supra note 123.
125. KIDS Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-400, 122 Stat. 4224 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
16915a).
126. Id. § 3(a)(1).
127. Id. § 3(a)(2).
128. PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2258A-E; 42 U.S.C. §§ 17601, 17611-16).
129. Id. §§ 101(a), (c)(1)-(2), (8), 102(a), 302, 303. The ICAC Task Force Program was
created in 1998 to help State and local law enforcement agencies enhance their response to child
pornography and enticement offenses on the Internet. MEDARIS & GIROUARD, supra note 9, at 3.
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While the federal laws that require information sharing and reporting by
website operators do not affect offenders as severely as those state laws that
entirely prohibit computer or Internet access, all of these laws undoubtedly
demonstrate an ever-increasing trend by federal and state legislatures in
tightening the rope on convicted sex offenders.1 30 However, if the new laws
interfere with a judge's discretion to evaluate release conditions, 131 the
question becomes whether a legislature should set mandatory conditions for
offenders, or whether courts should be free to make case-by-case
determinations based upon the totality of the circumstances. 32
II. INTERNET RESTRICTIONS: THE INHERENT IMPLICATIONS OF BROAD
RESTRICTIONS AND THE PRACTICALITY PROBLEMS OF NARROW RESTRICTIONS
Today, the Internet has become such a major information source and
communication tool that it is indispensable to the functioning of individuals
in society. 133 However, as the use of this technology grows, so does the
need to protect society from dangerous criminals using these resources
to victimize children. 13 Although computer and Internet restrictions have
become a common condition of supervised release, 135 they vary from complete
prohibitions on computer and Internet use, 136 to prohibitions with an exception
for probation officer approval, 137 to narrowly tailored restrictions emphasizing
the use of monitoring and filtering programs. 38 While a sex offender's liberty
interest is the concern with these first two restrictions, the practicality of
targeting specific unwanted Internet access is raised by the third type of
restriction.
130. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.6 (West Supp. 2008) (restricting Internet use
subject to written court order), with KIDS Act § 2(a), (e)(2) (requiring sex offenders to provide
Internet identifiers to the sex offender registry).
131. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.6 (leaving no discretion to the trial judge).
132. See James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 773, 777 (1995) ("Formal rules limit future judicial discretion
and generate predictability and consistency, while vague standards preserve the needed flexibility
to respond to unique or unforeseeable circumstances.").
133. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 4, at 1, 13 (noting that "[t]he Internet has become
an integral part of the economy").
134. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that "[c]ybersex offenders find the
computer and/or Internet a compelling tool in their deviant behavior" because of its unique
anonymity, the potential to "groom multiple victims," and the ability to store and conceal an
extensive collection of pornographic material).
135. See Hyne, supra note 3, at 216.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 160, 167 (5th Cir. 2001).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 983 (10th Cir. 2001).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing a
broad restriction and remanding to set a more focused condition of supervised release).
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A. Effects of Broad Internet Restrictions on the Offender
Although the Supreme Court has established that individuals on probation
are subject to a forfeiture of some constitutional rights, 139 courts have
recognized that at least some access to and use of the Internet is protected by
the First Amendment's right to free speech. 140 Because the Internet has
become a unique and world-wide medium of communication as well as a tool
for information gathering, a restriction of one's Internet access can be
compared with the denial of one's telephone use. 141 As explained by the
Supreme Court, "[a]nyone with access to the Intemet may take advantage of a
wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods,"'142 and it is
"no exaggeration to conclude that the content of the Internet is as diverse as
human thought."
' 143
If convicted sex offenders are not allowed Internet access, they are
undoubtedly prevented from participating in many everyday activities.144 For
example, a strict ban on Intemet access as a condition of release would prohibit
the offender from: getting money from an ATM; working for any company
that communicates primarily by e-mail; attending college; starting a business;
and even owning a cell phone, now that most cell phones have Internet
capabilities. 145
139. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) ("Inherent in the very nature of
probation is that probationers 'do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.'
Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting
probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed
by law-abiding citizens." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987))).
140. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (responding to
defendant's contention that the imposed condition violated his First Amendment rights, the court
noted that it was "particularly reluctant to uphold sweeping restrictions on important
constitutional rights").
141. See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001).
142. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
143. Id. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 4, at 11-13. A significant percentage of
Americans rely on the Internet to conduct various activities of daily life. For example, one study
found that the percentage of Americans who accessed the Internet per day increased from 36
percent of the entire adult population in January 2002 to 44 percent in December 2005. JOHN
HORRIGAN & LEE RA1NIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET'S GROWING
ROLE IN LIFE'S MAJOR MOMENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP_
Major%20Moments 2006.pdf. In addition, the percentage of adults who reported that they went
online at least once a day increased from 27 percent in January 2002 to 35 percent in late 2005.
Id
145. Wiest, supra note 29, at 866. Wiest makes the point that "[g]iven that most shopping
purchases are made with a credit card, [the offender] is arguably accessing the Internet when he
pays with a credit card." Id.
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While Internet access is not necessarily a "right" that can never be taken
away, 146 the extent to which the Internet has become so intertwined in the way
society functions has the potential to severely hinder those denied access.
147
Although it can be argued that there is little that cannot be accomplished
outside the virtual world, 148 little or no access to the Internet could
considerably alter the lives of many sex offenders. For example, many will
need to find a new job and others may live in rural areas that lack local
resources such as a library. 149 Not only will sex offenders possibly face broad
restrictions on basic decisions such as where to live,150 but they will also be
146. See Jessica Habib, Note, Cyber Crime and Punishment: Filtering Out Internet Felons,
14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1051, 1089 (2004) (noting that while Internet
use "may not rise to the level of a right," it is also not a "regulated activity or privilege for which
state permission is required"). Habib compared the revocation of a driver's license for driving
under the influence, to a restriction of Internet access as a condition of supervised release. Id. at
1087-88. Habib pointed out the fact that
[i]n this society where public transportation is neither non-existent or is, at best,
inadequate and entire commercial shopping areas are located in suburbs surrounding
our cities, [a driver's license can no longer be viewed] as merely a privilege which is
given by the State and which is subject to revocation at any time.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Carlos F. Ramirez, Note,
Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal Prosecution and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 950 (1996)). The author equated this point with the idea that Internet is
becoming increasingly important in the employment world, as well as everyday life activities, and
argued that without access to computers and the Internet, people may be "technologically
immobilized," and severely hindered in today's workforce. Id at 1087. Furthermore, Habib
argued that while the government reserves the power to revoke a license because driving is a
regulated activity, it is "difficult to argue that Internet use is a privilege granted by a certain
entity" because it is so easily and widely accessible. Id. at 1089. Accordingly, Habib concluded
that "it should be more difficult to restrict Internet use as a result of [a crime facilitated by the
Internet] than it is to suspend a license due to driving under the influence." Id.
147. Id at 1087.
148. See McKay, supra note 26, at 236. For example, "[t]ax returns can still be filed through
the mail, banking is still offered at local branches, news is available on broadcast television," the
weather is still in the daily newspaper, research can still be done through hardcopy, and general
communications remain available via telephone and mail. Id.
149. See Memorandum from Angie Boyce, Research Assistant, and Lee Raine, Director,
The Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Online Job Hunting 1-2 (July 2002), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP JobhuntMemo.pdf (reporting that fifty-two million
Americans have used the Internet to search for information about jobs, and over four million
Americans do so on a normal day).
150. Since a series of child abductions in the spring of 2005, many jurisdictions across the
United States have implemented residency restrictions that have essentially banned sex offenders
from living in certain cities. JILL S. LEVENSON, SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS: A
REPORT TO THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 2 (2005), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl-docs.nsf/
issues/sexoffenderattachments/$FILE/LevinsonFL.pdf. While these laws are appropriately
concerned with child safety, there is no evidence that residency restrictions actually prevent sex
crimes. Id. Furthermore, such laws greatly decrease available housing for sex offenders, forcing
them out of urban areas and essentially away from social support, employment opportunities,
education, and social services. Id. In fact, the report states, "[a]s a result, current social policies
[Vol. 58:779
Sentencing "Cybersex Offenders"
prevented from being involved in many aspects of the world around them-
denying them many opportunities to successfully reintegrate into their
communities.
151
The Internet can serve as an important educational, employment, and
everyday life tool, 152 and may be essential for reintegration of some offenders
into society. 153 As noted above, the goals of sentencing must "reflect the
seriousness of the offense .... afford adequate deterrence[,] . . . protect the
public[,] . . . [and] provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional
treatment in the most effective manner."' 54 By denying offenders the primary
means of finding and securing a job, overbroad computer and Internet
restrictions substantially undermine the rehabilitative goal of supervised
release. 155 For example, with the launch of USAJOBS.com, the federal
government has made obtaining employment within the government virtually
impossible without access to a computer or the Internet.
56
may contribute to dynamic risk factors for offenders in the community, ultimately becoming
counter-productive." Id at 10. As Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit wrote:
It is sad 20th Century Commentary that society views the convicted felon as a social
outcast. He has done wrong, so we rationalize and condone punishment in various
forms. We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while simultaneously
we do everything to prevent it. Society cares little for the conditions which a prisoner
must suffer while in prison; it cares even less for his future when he is released from
prison. He is a marked man. We tell him to return to the norm of behavior, yet we
brand him as virtually unemployable; he is required to live with his normal activities
severely restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when he returns to a
life of crime.
Mark Loudon-Brown, Note, "They Set Him on a Path Where He's Bound to Get Ill": Why Sex
Offender Residency Restrictions Should Be Abandoned, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 795, 796
(2007) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1971) (Lay, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
151. See John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts: A Proposal for
Managing the Risk of Returning Sex Offenders to the Community, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1173,
1187, 1189 (2004) ("Any sensible reentry process for sex offenders must focus both on
community protection and on offender rehabilitation.").
152. See HORRIGAN & RAINIE, supra note 144, at 2, 8 (reporting that 39 percent of all
Americans said that they would first look to the Internet to obtain government information, and
31 percent would first look online for health care information).
153. See Karen J. Hartman, Comment, Prison Walls and Firewalls: H.B. 2376-Arizona
Denies Inmates Access to the Internet, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1423, 1434-35 (2000) (discussing how
knowledge and use of computer skills is important for an inmate attempting to reintegrate into
society after completing a term of imprisonment); Rick Hepp & Robert Schwaneberg, Bill Would
Bar Sex Offenders From Internet, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), May 21, 2006, at 19.
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
155. See La Fond & Winick, supra note 151, at 1187-89.
156. See USAJOBS.com, Search Jobs, http://www.usajobs.gov (last visited Apr. 21, 2009)
("USAJOBS is the official job site of the United States Federal Government. It's your one-stop
source for Federal jobs and employment information.").
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Employment can help an offender successfully reenter society 157 because
steady work has been linked to increased public safety and deterrence of future
crime. 58 Accordingly, without the ability to research, apply for, and work at
any job that requires the use of a computer or the Internet, a sex offender is
undoubtedly hindered in becoming a productive member of society.159 When a
sex offender is released from prison without employment, and is forced to
suffer the continuing social stigma that accompanies notification and
registration requirements, 160 the sex offender is inevitably subject to increased
stress. 161 Consequently, this stress often results in a loss of self-esteem, which
"hamper[s] the offender's ability to adhere to a relapse prevention plan," and
essentially creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for the offender.1
62
Although the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have upheld broad Internet
restrictions, 163 these circuits have at least recognized that the Intemet has
grown into a valuable resource for all aspects of today's society.164 However,
the analysis of these circuits remains inadequate because it fails to fully
appreciate the negative effect that overbroad restrictions have on an offender's
rehabilitation process. In particular, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits focus too
heavily on the use of restrictive conditions as a deterrent.165 These circuits also
justify their decisions on the "concomitant dangers of the Intemet and the need
to protect both the public and sex offenders themselves from its potential
157. See Christopher Uggen, Sara Wakefield & Bruce Western, Work and Family
Perspective on Reentry, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 209, 211 (Jeremy Travis
& Christy Visher eds., 2005) ("Criminological theories and commonsense understandings of
crime and conformity underscore the importance of work as the setting for social reintegration.").
158. See Dave Anderson, Working to Reduce Recidivism: Employment as the Key to
Offender Reintegration, http://www.hrcrossing.com/article/index.php?id=270120 (last visited
Apr. 21, 2009) (reporting that the New York Department of Labor found that "eighty-three
percent of sex offenders who violated probation or parole were unemployed at the time"). As
noted by HRCrossing, a lead job-opening research company, a stable job not only provides a
steady paycheck, but it also "bolsters ex-offenders' work experience and teaches much-needed
skills." Id. Through building a resume and earning the respect of their employers, ex-offenders
who can get and keep a job will develop stronger connections to society and have a greater
chance of successful rehabilitation. Id.
159. See La Fond & Winick, supra note 15 1, at 1187 (positing that successful reentry of the
offender into the community should mean that "the returning offender will become a productive
member of society, an asset to the community rather than a liability").
160. See supra note 3 for an explanation of sex offender registration requirements.
161. La Fond & Winick, supra note 151, at 1188.
162. Id.; see also Wiest, supra note 29, at 867 ("[A]llowing unduly burdensome restrictions
undermines the general goal of rehabilitation. With such onerous punishment, we necessarily
encourage additional criminal behaviors where the ex-convict is unable to reintegrate into
society.").
163. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 622 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn,
321 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
164. See, e.g., Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093.
165. See, e.g., id. at 1092-93 (emphasizing that restricting Internet access can help prevent
future criminal activity).
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abuses," as well as the idea that the offenders can still seek probation officer
approval. 1
66
While the public safety concern should be a high priority to all sentencing
courts, it should not completely undercut the concern of rehabilitating an
offender. 167 Supervised release is necessary to decrease the risk to the
community; however, the ultimate goal of any sensible correctional process is
not only prevention of recidivism, but also "the successful reentry of the
offender into the community. '' 68 By eliminating one of the primary means a
person can become immersed back into society, widespread Internet
restrictions only serve to keep offenders sheltered from the world they are
trying to reenter. 1
69
Mindful that offenders may need the Internet as part of their rehabilitation
process, the Second and Third Circuits have proposed more limited restrictions
designed to meet specific and discernable public safety needs.' 70 To facilitate
reintegration, other courts have allowed offenders to have access to the Internet
166. See id. at 1093. Although the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Walser, upheld a
condition of release, it noted that
[i]t may nevertheless be questionable whether the condition imposes no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to meet the goals referred to in 18
U.S.C. § 3853(d), since the vagueness of the special condition leaves open the
possibility that the probation officer might unreasonably prevent the defendant from
accessing one of the central means of information-gathering and communication in our
culture today.
275 F.3d 981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001). However, the court held it was "not persuaded [that] this
concern rises to the level necessary to clear the extremely high hurdle set by the plain error
standard." Id.
167. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-225, at 125 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3308
(stating that the terms of supervised release are similar to probation, but not as strict because the
defendant should be moving along with his life).
168. La Fond& Winick, supra note 151, at 1187.
169. As noted in a Pew Internet and American Life Project:
The Internet has become increasingly important to users in their everyday lives....
[Fifty percent of those surveyed] said the internet played a major role as they pursued
more training in their careers. [Forty-five percent] ... said the internet played a major
role as they made major investment or financial decisions. [Forty-three percent] . . .
said the internet played a major role when they looked for a new place to live ...
[Twenty-three percent] ... said the internet played a major role as they bought a new
car. [Finally, fourteen percent] said the internet played a major role as they switched
jobs.
HORRIGAN & RAINIE, supra note 144, at 1.
170. See United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2002) (arguing that narrower
restrictions, such as monitoring systems, will be adequate to meet public safety needs); see also
United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that completely cutting off
the defendant's access to legitimate and innocent Internet uses, such as e-mail, is unnecessary).
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for legitimate purposes. 17 1 However, are these approaches practical and willthey provide the appropriate and necessary balance? 172
B. Limited Internet Restrictions: Are They Practical in a Society Where the
Internet Is So Prevalent?
As an alternative to conditions that restrict all access to computers and the
Internet, several courts have proposed less restrictive means, such as
prohibitions on certain websites enforced through filtering and monitoring
systems. 173 These compromises strike a better balance between offenders'
interests and the need to ensure that they do not re-offend. 17 4 For example, in
United States v. Holm, the Seventh Circuit rejected a broad restriction on the
defendant's computer and Internet use, proposing that "[v]arious forms of
monitored Internet use might provide a middle ground between the need to
ensure that Holm never again uses the Worldwide Web for illegal purposes and
the need to allow him to function in the modem world."
175
Proponents of these narrowly tailored conditions contend that filtering
software can block objectionable material by either "blacklisting [certain] sites
and removing them from access, or by whitelisting [permissible] sites,
blocking access to all sites except those listed on the 'white' list based on
categories of content." 176 However, as the Tenth Circuit admitted in United
States v. White, "the software regulates content only on the computer in which
it is installed, and none of the software presently available is completely
effective."' 177 Even if these programs are completely effective in blocking
171. See United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. See Nancy Lofholm, Law's Eye on Sex-Offender Digital Trials, DENVER POST, Mar. 14,
2008, at Al (reporting that a problem is created when many sex offenders know more about
computers and the Internet than their probation officers).
173. See, e.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126-27 (rejecting a broad restriction because a more
focused restriction, limited to certain sites and images, could be enforced through surprise
inspections of the defendant's home and any computer he owned).
174. See, e.g., Holm, 326 F.3d at 878.
175. Id. at 877-79.
176. United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001).
177. Id. Probation officers presently lack monitoring systems designed exclusively for their
use. Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 7. However, there are merchants who offer off the shelf
products that can be used by probation offices to survey a computer user's activity. Id. For
example, Security Software Systems Inc. of Sugar Grove, Illinois "donated 100 copies of their
'Cyber Sentinel' security software to [probation offices] to be used to monitor the activities of
convicted sex offenders." Press Release, Securing Software Sys., SSSI Donates Software to
Local Govt. to Track Sex Offenders (Sept. 7, 2001), available at http://www.securitysoft.com/
press release.asp?NewslD=5. The "Cyber Sentinel" software can be used to "automatically
analyze, monitor, filter, and block undesirable, predatory, and sexually explicit computer
activity." Id. The program is designed so that an email will automatically be sent to the
probation officer once a violation has occurred. Id. In addition, a "Field Search Program" in
Nueces County, Texas, now allows probation officers to conduct a forensic search of any
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desired websites, they nonetheless fail to prevent an offender from trafficking
inappropriate material via e-mail and it is almost impossible for probation
officers to ensure that these programs remain up-to-date, given the ever-
increasing number of social networks. 178 Even more troubling is the fact that
software is also available that allows knowledgeable Internet users to delete the
names of sites visited from the computer's hard drive. 1
79
In recognizing these limitations of monitoring systems, some circuits have
suggested that any narrowly tailored restriction placed on an offender's
computer use or Internet access must be accompanied by random computer
searches and consistent monitoring by probation officers in order to
compensate for such limitations.' However, probation offices generally lack
the necessary funding for proper monitoring equipment and often fail to obtain
the technical expertise required for adequate training. 181 In addition, the
growth of the personal computer and the Internet has further complicated busy
probation officers' caseloads with offenders who are often more computer
savvy than the officers attempting to supervise them.'
82
Regardless of the downsides to monitoring programs and despite the fact
that there is nothing to prevent a motivated sex offender from using a friend's
computer or a public computer with Internet access, proponents of narrowly
tailored conditions argue that efforts to monitor and supervise Internet activity
can help low-risk offenders turn their lives around. 183 Furthermore, even if
convicted sex offenders continue to offend, they will eventually be
offender's hard drive and monitor the offender's real-time activity. Sex Offenders: Tracking Em'
Down, KIIITV NEWS, Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.kiiitv.com/news/local/27034879.html.
178. See McKay, supra note 26, at 235.
179. White, 244 F.3d at 1206-07; see also Lofholm, supra note 172 ("Offenders can now
make end runs around some monitoring programs by using cellphones, Blackberrys, iPods, and
video games to access the Internet. Programs are also available to wipe hard drives clean.").
180. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that
unannounced inspections of the defendant's computer would be an appropriate and reasonable
restriction); see also White, 244 F.3d at 1207. It is important to note that, while these random
searches of convicted sex offenders' homes by probation officers certainly implicate several
Fourth Amendment issues, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that probationers do not enjoy the
same degree of liberty as other citizens, thus these issues will not be discussed here. Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) ("[A] probation officer may . . . search a probationer's
home without a warrant, and with only 'reasonable grounds' (not probable cause) to believe that
contraband is present.").
181. Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 7 (warning that any evidence discovered must be
appropriately and carefully handled in order to prevent the destruction of any information which
may lead to the discovery of additional criminals).
182. Nat'l Law Enforcement and Corrs. Tech. Ctr., 'Monitoring' the Sex Offender, TECH
BEAT, Winter 2005, at 1, available at http://www.justnet.org/TechBeat%20Files/MonitorSex
Offender.pdf [hereinafter TECH BEAT].
183. See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
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discovered. 184  Accordingly, when such monitoring succeeds in catching a
violator, these specified conditions would mandate that the offender return to
prison without a trial, and would notify officials of the re-offense in order to
prevent illegal behavior in the future. 85 As noted in United States v. Freeman,
"if [an offender] does not abide by more limited conditions of release . . . it
might [then] be appropriate to ban all use [of the Internet]. 186
III. THE DEBATE: JUDICIAL DISCRETION OR UNIFORMITY BY LAW?
A. Factual Distinctions Require Case-by-Case Determinations
The significant amount of discretion granted to judges fashioning the
conditions of supervised release has led to a circuit split regarding the
appropriate balance between the interest in protecting the public and the
interest in preventing undue deprivation of an individual offender's liberty.'
87
As demonstrated by the arguments on both sides of the issue, the line between
protecting the public, deterring the offender, and preserving the rehabilitation
process is a thin one at best. Society's interests in protecting the public and
preventing recidivism favor imposing heavy restrictions on convicted sex
offenders. 189 However, the interests of the individual offender and the
practical importance of the Internet suggest that courts should refrain from
imposing severe Internet restrictions. 19 While the interest in public safety
seems to outweigh the need to give an offender access to a resource he has
already abused, several circuits have recognized that such a conclusion is not
so easily reached. 191
As previously discussed, in an attempt to crack down on the growing threat
of Internet predators, the New Jersey state legislature' 92 and various circuitshave mandated broad Internet restrictions for sex offenders. 193 While all-
184. TECH BEAT, supra note 182, at 2 (instructing probation officers "to equate the computer
check [of sex offenders] to a drug test," suggesting that much like drug users the sex offender
"may beat a particular test, but.., will eventually get caught").
185. See Wiest, supra note 29, at 871.
186. United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
187. See discussion supra Part I.A-C.
188. See discussion supra Part IL.A-B.
189. See Kreston, supra note 20, at 30 ("Protection of the public and deterrence of future
crime are acknowledged goals of sentencing. The defendant's counterbalancing interests in
effective correctional treatment should not entitle him to obtain access to the Internet, a medium
he has already misused to receive and possess child pornography.").
190. See Wiest, supra note 29, at 871 (concluding that "complete" Internet and computer
prohibitions will inevitably lead to "offenders who are unable to meaningfully function and
reintegrate back into society").
191. See, e.g., Freeman, 316 F.3d at 391-92.
192. See supra Part I.D.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Granger, 117 F. App'x 247, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167-70 (5th Cir. 2001).
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encompassing restrictions seem like an obvious solution, they fail to take into
account the needs of individual offenders and the different factors that must be
considered under federal law. 
194
Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker
rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, 195 district
courts have been free to depart from the Guidelines in order to fashion more
individualized sentences in accordance with the factors laid out in § 3553(a). 196
While such judicial discretion has led to disparity among circuit courts, the
ability to grant proper sentences based on the facts presented is necessary in
order to effectively balance the desired goals of sentencing.197 For example, in
their opinions, several circuits distinguished between offenders who used a
computer or the Intemet in the commission of a crime and offenders who did
not, as well as between offenders who had an employment background in
computer technology and offenders whose employment history did not involve
computer or Internet use.
199
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000) (listing the "factors to be considered in imposing a
sentence").
195. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
196. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (affirming
a sentence which was below the Sentencing Guideline range for distribution of child pornography
as reasonable).
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
198. Compare United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1999)
(upholding a broad restriction where the defendant used the Internet to communicate and
ultimately have sex with a fourteen-year-old girl), with United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386,
391-92 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that unlike the defendant in Crandon, Freeman never used the
Internet to illegally communicate with minors), and United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 82-83
(2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting overbroad computer and Internet restrictions because there was no
evidence linking the defendant's incest conviction to a computer or the Internet). As previously
noted, the distinction between those who "merely" possess child pornography and those who use
the computer in the commission of a crime suggests that "possession of child pornography is a
victimless crime." Kreston, supra note 20, at 30. However, according to a recent study, "40
percent of arrested child pornography possessors were dual offenders who sexually victimized
children and also possessed child pornography." Id. Nevertheless, it has also been argued that
there is a major difference "between Internet crime and Intemet-related crime," and that courts
should only restrict Internet access "where the Internet was a necessary tool of the offense,
without which the underlying crime could not have been committed." Habib, supra note 146, at
1074, 1090. Jessica Habib clearly defined the issue:
The goal of the supervised release condition should be to deter the underlying conduct,
not to restrict one of many methods by which the crime has been realized-especially
when that method does not involve a weapon, per se, but a technology with abundant
legitimate uses. In many cases, there is a fine line between the use of the Internet to
facilitate the crime and use that is merely incidental to its commission.
The threshold analysis, thus, should be whether the defendant could have committed
the crime without going online to do so.
Id. at 1090-91.
199. Compare United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that a
complete ban on Internet use was overbroad when the defendant had worked in the computerized
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In addition, courts must take into account relevant characteristics of each
defendant including, but not limited to, whether the defendant has expressed
remorse for or is in denial of his crimes; whether the defendant is a
sophisticated computer user; the defendant's family life and educational
background; the defendant's criminal and mental history; and most obviously,
the extent of the crime committed °. °  Consideration of these factors, in
addition to individualized assessments of each offender's overall threat to
society, is necessary to protect the public while allowing those deserving the
opportunity to successfully re-enter society.
20 1
B. Appellate Review: Deferential Treatment to District Court Decisions Is
Required
Because district court judges are granted the discretionary authority to weigh
certain factors and order a sentence accordingly, appellate courts are called
upon to review the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of
discretion standard.20 2 However, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
appellate courts must give substantial deference to the decision of the district
courts. 203 Because a district court is able to evaluate live witnesses, determine
credibility, and assess the evidence presented, a district court is in a better
position to make factual findings and tailor sentences according to the
characteristics of the defendant and the factors outlined in § 3553(a). 204
Therefore, appellate courts have a limited power of review and may only
telecommunications field for thirty years), with United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 170 & n.17
(5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a total Internet ban where the defendant raised no particular concern as
to the restriction's affect on his employment because he had mainly been employed as a truck
driver).
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
201. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 5 ("The decision to recommend discretionary
computer conditions should be based upon the following criteria: probation/parole law in the
particular jurisdiction; the offense of conviction; computer knowledge/skills of the offender; prior
criminal conduct involving computers; necessity of the offender to have computer/Internet access;
and the availability of a computer or the Internet to the offender."). Bowker and Gray also point
out that determining what kind of offender the courts are dealing with is critical to fashioning the
appropriate sentence, and familiarity with the documents found on the offender's computer is
especially relevant. Id. at 4. For example,. while the size of a collection clearly indicates the
offenders' obsession with illegal material, an individual with a large amount of video files
demonstrates a greater degree of commitment because these files take longer to download. Id. In
addition, file names and organizational methods are critical to assessing the offender because
much more dedication is required to categorize a large inventory of images. Id. Finally, the
offender's use of the images (i.e., to masturbate, lure children, or to trade for other pornography)
should factor into a determination of the seriousness of the offender's habits. Id.
202. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).
203. Id. at 597.
204. Id.
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reverse a sentencing order if the district court reached a conclusion that no
205
reasonable judge could reach.
While the authority of appellate courts is restricted to reviewing the
reasonableness of the district court's conclusion,206 it would be unsound to
suggest that appellate courts could never overturn a district court's sentencing
order. For example, if an improper factor is considered, if a judge has clear
bias against a group of defendants, or if a sentence is simply irrational, an
appellate court should reverse a sentence as an unreasonable abuse of
207discretion. As stated above, however, appellate courts must give proper
deference to the decision of the district courts and should not review a decision
de novo. 20 8 Therefore, appellate courts should be limited to reviewing the
reasonableness of the district court's assessment of the factors set out in §
3553(a), and should refrain from conducting their own determination of what
is reasonable.
20 9
C. The Preservation of Judicial Discretion Is Necessary for Individualized
Conditions
Although opponents, citing the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, question
the enforceability of tailored Internet restrictions, their criticisms are less
persuasive in the case of lower-risk offenders. 21 Admittedly, any sort of ban
might not preclude the lifetime offender from engaging in extreme activities to
obtain child pornography. 211  However, for low-risk offenders and for
offenders who are more likely to be receptive to rehabilitation, narrowly
tailored restrictions are the only way to encourage rehabilitation while
simultaneously seeking to protect society.
205. See id,
206. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
207. Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MiAMi L.
REv. 1115, 1154-57 (2008).
208. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594.
209. See id at 597 ("The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a
different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify a reversal of the district court.").
2 10. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 5 (indicating that the first step in the restriction
analysis should be the evaluation of the offender's behavior, and "[o]bviously, more restrictive
conditions should be considered for offenders who have personally victimized a minor or
demonstrated a willingness to do so").
211. Id. As Bowker and Gray noted, "[s]ome may wonder what would prevent an offender
from just going out and getting another computer ... or using some other unmonitored computer.
The answer is nothing-just as there is nothing but fear of discovery to stop an offender from
using drugs or obtaining a gun." Id.
2009]
Catholic University Law Review
212 214While the statutes passed by Nevada, 12 Florida,213 and New Jersey
certainly generate predictability and consistency, such formal rules limit
judicial discretion and prevent the flexibility needed to respond to the unique
circumstances of each offender.2 1 5 Statutes that require such broad restrictions
for all offenders do not allow sentencing courts to fashion supervised
conditions in an individualized manner. As a result, a one-size-fits-all law
completely forecloses the possibility for narrowly tailored restrictions to offer
low-risk offenders a greater chance of successful rehabilitation.
216
To propose that courts consider these factors when determining the
permissibility of limited Internet restrictions should not be misconstrued as
advocating that the right of convicted sex offenders to enjoy today's
technology outweighs the need to protect the public, especially children, from
the dangers and potential victimization that accompany the Internet. However,
courts free of legislative mandates may determine that public safety will not be
endangered by permitting limited access to the Internet, as long as sufficient
217policies are in place should the offender relapse. In addition, courts should
not assume that offenders who did not use the Internet in the commission of
the crime are free from risk and thus do not need any restrictions. Rather,
courts should engage in individual assessments, in accordance with statutory
guidelines and established criteria, to objectively determine the particular
offenders' overall threat to society if they are permitted limited computer and
Internet access.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts are often called on to balance the public's interest with the rights of
the individual. At the center of this debate is how to appropriately handle the
increasing threat of online sexual predators, particularly those who victimize
children. While some courts argue that the ubiquitous nature of computers and
212. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176A.410(l)(q) (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting an offender
from using the Internet unless he obtains approval from his probation officer).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.30(1)(h) (West 2006) (imposing a total ban until the facilitator
of defendant's treatment program determines he may have certain limited access).
214. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6.6 (West Supp. 2008) (requiring the offender to obtain
written court approval to use the Internet, except in cases where the offender wishes to use the
Internet for employment activities, in which case the offender need only obtain the approval of
his probation officer).
215. See Bowker & Gray, supra note 2, at 5.
216. See KIDS Act of 2008, Pub. L. No., §§ 2(a), 3(a), 110-400, 122 Stat. 4224, 4224-25 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16915a-b). Although statutes that restrict all Internet access for all
offenders are overly broad, others that restrict offenders' access to certain websites serve to
provide a better balance between offenders' interests and the need to protect the public and should
certainly be encouraged. See id.
217. See United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that if Freeman
was unable to comply with more liberal computer and Internet restrictions, it would then be
proper to restrict all computer and Internet access).
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the Internet does not justify all-encompassing restrictions, 218 others contend
that, despite the pervasiveness of technology today, broad restrictions are
necessary to meet the dual goals of deterrence and protecting the public. 219
Because the Internet can provide a frightening level of anonymity to a sexual
offender and has the potential to create an overwhelming number of victims,
courts are justified in taking very seriously the danger of exposing sex
offenders to the Internet. However, as with other crimes, there are different
threat levels and offender characteristics, requiring a customization approach
to Internet restrictions. Therefore, courts must objectively weigh the totality of
the circumstances for each offender and the offender's crime, and impose
computer and Internet restrictions accordingly-a solution that will only be
possible if state legislatures refrain from implementing broad laws that
mandate such restrictions.
218. See supra Part I.C.
219. See supra Part I.B.
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